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JUVENILE LAW
INTRODUCTION
Juvenile law has always been a complicated subject to untangle.
Courts historically have had difficulties deciding how to label and treat
juveniles because the crimes they commit are difficult to categorize and
society is reluctant to view children as mature individuals. Simply stated,
children are immature, lacking the faculties and responsibilities of adults.
Juveniles learn and react through their unique experiences which creates
a severe tension when courts attempt to treat individuals in a common
juvenile system. Society tends to protect a child offender's innocence,
but this tendency is difficult to sustain when children commit increas-
ingly atrocious crimes.
Juveniles were subjected to the same justice system as adults until
the late nineteenth century.' The juvenile justice system today is an en-
tirely different entity from the justice system for adults.' "These systems
are governed by different laws, follow different procedures, use different
terminology, and operate under different philosophies as to their purpose
and the nature of the suspects who come before them."3
Be it the commission of crimes or the capacity to stand trial or tes-
tify, the struggle to define the contours of juvenile justice within an adult
focused system is a persistent reality. This survey' attempts to unravel
some of the mysteries behind the juvenile justice system, why it exists as
it does, and where it is going through an analysis of the Tenth Circuit's
treatment of juvenile law. Part I explores the transfer of juveniles to adult
status through United States v. Leon, D.M.' Part II discusses children as
witnesses through United States v. Allen J." Although competency re-
quirements are the same for both children and adults,7 courts treat child
witnesses with more discretion. Questions arise regarding the veracity of
children's statements and their ability to withstand the severe psycho-
logical impact of trial type proceedings.8 Issues of child abuse further
1. See MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 179 (1997).
2. See PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., AGE, CRIME, AND SANCTIONS: THE TRANSITION
FROM JUVENILE TO ADULT COURT at v (1980).
3. Id.
4. This survey addresses cases decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals between Sep-
tember 1, 1997, and August 31, 1998.
5. 132 F.3d 583 (10th Cir. 1997).
6. 127 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1997).
7. The Federal Rules of Evidence state: "Every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules." FED. R. EVID. 601. The rules set out no further exceptions for
children. See id.
8. Cf. Lucy Berliner, The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 167, 169 (1985).
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complicate these proceedings.9 This survey examines the advantages and
disadvantages of allowing children to testify and discusses the emer-
gence of juvenile witnesses and their place in the juvenile justice system.
I. TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO ADULT STATUS
A. Background
In recent decades, an onslaught of juvenile offenders committing
heinous crimes flooded the justice system."' Appalled citizens recognized
that sentences for many felonies, including murder, allowed a juvenile to
go to jail only until he or she attained the age of majority after which
time he or she was returned to the streets." The courts may impose more
lenient sanctions and penalties on young criminal offenders until the ju-
venile system labels them as "adults.""2
The trend is for society to respond to juvenile offenders with reha-
bilitation, not severe punishment.'3 Underlying this trend is the theory
that children are of a tender age, and the system has an obligation to try
to "fix" them so that they can become a functional part of society."' Fur-
thermore, the different capacities of adults and children require different
treatment under the law." The state acts as the parens patriae of the
9. See generally Elizabeth Vaughan Baker, Psychological Expert Testimony on a Child's
Veracity in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 50 LA. L. REV. 1039 (1990) (arguing that the justice
system needs to revamp itself in order to serve the needs of increasing child sex abuse cases); Chris-
tine Brannon, The Trauma of Testifying in Court for Child Victims of Sexual Assault v. The Ac-
cused's Right to Confrontation, 18 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 439 (1994) (discussing the different
theories as to how children react to testifying and whether it is contrary to the defendant's due proc-
ess rights); Julie A. Dale, Comment, Ensuring Reliable Testimony from Child Witnesses in Sexual
Abuse Cases: Applying Social Science Evidence to a New Fact-Finding Method, 57 ALB. L. REV.
187 (1993) (analyzing whether children's testimony in sexual abuse cases is reliable enough to
utilize, and suggesting ways to improve the process).
10. See generally JUDGE JERRY L. MERSHON, JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE ADJUDICATORY AND
DISPOSmONAL PROCESS 11-1; (1991) (analyzing the juvenile justice system from its inception
through the present adjudicatory process); Charles J. Aron & Michele S.C. Hurley, Juvenile Justice
at the Crossroads, 22 CHAMPION 10, 10-tI (1998) (discussing the expansion of younger juvenile
offenders and how they should be handled in the justice system, and encouraging the maintenance of
the juvenile court system as a means of protecting our children); Edward L. Thompson, Juvenile
Delinquency: A Judge's View of Our Past, Present, and Future, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 655, 655 (1993)
(addressing the increase in serious juvenile crimes, particularly with respect to the Oklahoma Juve-
nile Code); Holly Beatty, Comment, Is the Trend to Expand Juvenile Transfer Statutes Just an Easy
Answer to a Complex Problem?, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 979, 980 (1995) (questioning the motives
behind transferring juveniles to adult status in criminal court).
11. Cf Thompson, supra note 10, at 655-56.
12. See DEAN J. CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING,
AND THE LAW 1-2 (1992).
13. Cf. Catherine J. Ross, Disposition in a Discretionary Regime: Punishment and Rehabilita-
tion in the Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1038-39 (1995); Thompson, supra note
10, at 656-57; Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of
Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 373 (1998).
14. See Aron & Hurley, supra note 10, at 11-12.
15. See Ross, supra note 13, at 1038.
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child, striving to protect the child's integrity. 6 Difficulties arise, how-
ever, when juveniles commit particularly violent crimes, and society
favors punishment over protection in the belief that doing so serves the
best interests of justice." Ongoing tension results between the desire to
protect and rehabilitate juvenile offenders, and society's appetite for ret-
ribution in cases where especially violent crimes are committed.'8
Historically, judges looked to the nature of the offender, not the of-
fense.'9 Considering the increasingly violent nature of juvenile crimes,
the particular circumstances of juvenile offenders are eliciting less sym-
pathy from the public and, looking forward, the life circumstances of
juvenile offenders likely will carry less weight with the courts. Judges
may be hesitant to send a juvenile to jail for fear of the consequences of
exposure of the juvenile to prison life, yet more and more juveniles are
being prosecuted in adult criminal courts.'
1. Emergence of Procedural Rights
Two Supreme Court decisions primarily shape juvenile rights within
the judicial system. Kent v. United States' paved the way for emerging
juvenile rights, holding that juveniles are entitled to a hearing before trans-
fer to adult criminal court and the right to confer with counsel throughout
the hearing process.23 The ideals expressed in the Kent case stemmed from
"social welfare policy rather than in the corpus juris."' The parens patriae
role of the state dictated a supervisory role of the government:
The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the
needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal
16. See id. at 1039. Parens patriae is the theory that the government acts as an "ultimate
parent and guardian of all children, car[ing] for all children who need [] protection." Id.
17. See id. at 1039-41.
18. Cf. id. at 1044; Beatty, supra note 10, at 979.
19. See Klein, supra note 13, at 377.
20. See id. at 402.
21. See Aron & Hurley, supra note 10, at 10-12. Aron and Hurley raise the point that the
offenders are still children:
As society becomes more punitive in response to rising crime rates, it fails to recognize
and acknowledge that juvenile offenders are children. They are children often confronted
by family and socioeconomic problems and personal trauma which negatively influence
their behavior, often resulting in heinous acts. Many juvenile offenders live lives more
problematic and horrific than most adults can imagine. Such backgrounds call for reha-
bilitation, not punishment; opportunity, not ostracism. They are, after all, children.
Id. at 11.
22. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Kent, age 14, was convicted of housebreaking and robbery and
placed on probation. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 543. Two years later, police officers took Kent into cus-
tody for robbing and raping a D.C. woman. See id. They interrogated him at the police headquarters
without the benefit of counsel or his parents. See id at 534-44. Kent was then detained in a Receiv-
ing Home for a week, with no hearing or arraignment. See id. at 544-45. The juvenile court waived
jurisdiction without a hearing and without ruling on any of the motions filed by Kent's counsel. See
id. at 546.
23. See id. at 561.
24. Id. at 554.
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conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and re-
habilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal
responsibility, guilt and punishment.25
The Court's decision in In re Gault' expanded the definition of juve-
nile rights by granting the right to notice of charges, to counsel, to con-
frontation, to cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privilege against
self-incrimination.' Both Kent and Gault underscored the fact. that
"[j]uvenile courts had failed to deliver on their promise of treatment, and
instead were merely providing punishment in the form of training
schools or other types of incarceration."2
2. Transfer Process
Removal of juvenile offenders from the juvenile to adult judicial
system occurs by way of a "transfer" of jurisdiction." Since the juvenile
courts were developed to address juvenile crimes, a compelling reason to
prosecute under adult law must exist. Juvenile defendants will typically
argue against the transfer process because the sentencing alternatives
under the adult system may be much more severe."
Only three avenues exist for a juvenile to be transferred to adult
criminal court, all of which are governed by statute.3 First, the juvenile
court may waive jurisdiction.32 Second, statutes may mandate immediate
transfer, depending on the type of crime.33 Finally, the legislature may
give the prosecutor discretion to file charges either in juvenile or adult
criminal court.'
Few jurisdictions provide for an intermediary court where juvenile
sentencing may be more appropriate.' Although transfer methods exist,
juveniles tried in juvenile court may be awarded longer sentences and
harsher punishments than offenders tried for similar crimes in adult
25. Id. The Court continues to explain that the parental role of the state encourages a civil, not
a criminal dimension to juvenile proceedings. See id. at 555. "[The child cannot complain of the
deprivation of important rights available in criminal cases. It has been asserted that he can claim
only the fundamental due process right to fair treatment." Id. (footnote omitted).
26. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault was fifteen years old when he was convicted of making obscene
phone calls. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4-7. Gault was sent to the State Industrial School for a
maximum of six years by the juvenile court for being a "delinquent." Id. at 4.
27. See id. at 28-31.
28. THoMAs GRusso, JuvENiLES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS, LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
COMPETENCE 4-5 (1981).
29. See Leta R. Holden, Tenth Circuit Survey, Juvenile Law, 73 DENy. U. L. REv. 843, 855
(1996).
30. See Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juve-
nile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1254, 1261 (1996).




35. See Holden, supra note 29, at 855.
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criminal court?' Alternatively, juveniles tried in adult criminal court will
be subject "to the full range of adult punishments, including life impris-
onment and the death penalty."37
Title 18, section 5032 of the United States Code governs
delinquency 8 proceedings in federal district courts and the transfer of
children for criminal prosecution. 9 The statute deters the transfer of ju-
veniles to adult status in order to encourage individual rehabilitation and
discourage the stigma attached to adult status and criminal trials.'
On the other hand, the statute indicates that juvenile offenders may
be transferred to adult status if it serves the best interests of justice.' The
statute sets out six factors to weigh when considering a transfer:
[11 the age and social background of the juvenile; [2] the nature of the
alleged offense; [3] the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delin-
quency record; [4] the juvenile's present intellectual development and
psychological maturity; [5] the nature of past treatment efforts and
the juvenile's response to such efforts; [and 6] the availability of pro-
grams designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.42
The statute also provides for an analysis of the nature of the offense,
taking into consideration
the extent to which the juvenile played a leadership role in an organi-
zation, or otherwise influenced other persons to take part in criminal
activities, involving the use or distribution of controlled substances or
firearms. Such a factor, if found to exist, shall weigh in favor of a
transfer to adult status, but the absence of this factor shall not pre-
clude such a transfer. 3
3. Transfer in the Tenth Circuit
In addressing whether a court should transfer juveniles transferred to
adult status, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concentrates pri-
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. It is important to distinguish between "delinquency" and "status offenses." Delinquency
exists when children commit offenses that would also be offenses if committed by an adult. See
GARDNER, supra note 1, at 199. Status offenses are those that are unique to children (such as tru-
ancy). See id. Juvenile courts tend to have original jurisdiction over both. See id.
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. H 1996).
40. See In re Sealed Case (Juvenile Transfer), 893 F.2d 363, 367-68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating
that the purpose of the Juvenile Delinquency Act lies in the recognition that "it is in the best interest
of both the juvenile and society that juveniles be insulated from the stigma associated with criminal
trials, the publicity, the retributive atmosphere and threat of criminal incarceration attendant to
criminal proceedings"); see also U.S. v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1980) (stat-
ing that the purpose of the Juvenile Delinquency Act is to remove juveniles from the regular criminal
justice system and to treat them separately from adults).
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manly on jurisdictional issues, as opposed to the section 5032 statutory
factors. The Tenth Circuit has established that the court does not have
jurisdiction over transfer orders because they are not final orders.' In
1996, the Tenth Circuit was in accord with other circuits in claiming that
"an order transferring a juvenile to be tried as an adult is immediately
appealable." 5 This is the doctrine of collateral order.' which provides
certain exceptions to the general rule requiring a final judgment for an
interlocutory appeal. The three situations that warrant an immediate ap-
peal are when the order has conclusively determined the question in de-
bate, resolved a separate important issue other than the merits of the case,
or will be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." 7
The Tenth Circuit's 1996 decision, United States v. Angelo D..' al-
lowed an immediate appeal of a transfer order because any delay would
threaten the benefits afforded by the juvenile justice system. 9 These
threatened benefits included serving time at a foster home or a commu-
nity-based facility closer to the juvenile's home, instead of an adult
prison that may be far away and more dangerous;' keeping records and
photographs sealed from the public and the media; and concealing the
juvenile's identity." If the defendant had to wait until there was a final
judgment at the close of the trial before bringing an appeal, these benefits
could not accrue, defeating the purpose of having a separate juvenile
justice system." The Tenth Circuit also ruled that "[t]he purpose of the
federal juvenile delinquency proceeding is to remove juveniles from the
ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal
conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation."' 3 In 1997, the
Tenth Circuit decided the following case in an effort to further this
proposition.
44. See United States v. Angelo D., 88 F.3d 856, 857-58 (10th Cir. 1996).
45. Id. Other circuits have followed this rule as well. Cf United States v. J.J.K., 76 F.3d 870,
871-72 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 865 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. One
Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d 841, 844 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. A.R., 38 F.3d 699, 701-02 (3d Cir.
1994); United States v. Bilbo, 19 F.3d 912, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Gerald N., 900
F.2d 189, 190 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 368; United States v. Smith, 851 F.2d
706, 708 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. A.W.J., 804 F.2d 492, 492 (8th Cir. 1986); United States
v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1984).
46. The doctrine of collateral order arose out of the 1949 Supreme Court decision in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,545-47 (1949).
47. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
48. 88 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1996).
49. See Angelo D., 88 F.3d at 858 (citing United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir.
1996)).
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 5035 (1994); see also Angelo D., 88 F.3d at 858.
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (1994 & Supp. II1996); see also Angelo D., 88 F.3d at 858.
52. See Angelo D., 88 F.3d at 858.
53. United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v.
Mechem, 509 F.2d 1193, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 1975)); Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480, 481
(10th Cir. 1966); United States v. Webb, 112 F. Supp. 950,950-51 (W.D. Okla. 1953)).
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B. Tenth Circuit Decision-United States v. Leon, D.M?'
1. Facts
Leon D.M., seventeen years old, was charged with murdering a two-
year-old boy on a San Juan Indian reservation in New Mexico." Before
the murder, Leon moved in with a twenty-five-year-old woman, Ms.
Chavez, had a child with her, and helped take care of three children from
her previous marriage. 6 On November 16, 1995, Leon called Ms. Chavez
at work because one of her children had allegedly fallen off of a bicycle
and needed medical attention 7 Leon attempted to administer cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation, but upon arrival at the hospital the victim died.'
An autopsy revealed that the injuries and death could not have resulted
from a bicycle injury, but only from multiple blows inflicted at the same
time.59 The government submitted evidence of some child abuse, and the
court asked both parties to submit information regarding facilities that
accepted juvenile offenders.' The trial court judge considered the factors
set forth in section 5032 of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Acte' and
denied a motion to transfer to adult status. 2 On appeal, the government
contended that the district court erred in denying the motion to transfer.
Leon argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal and, on the
merits, the record supported keeping him in juvenile status."
2. Decision
a. Jurisdiction
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals claimed jurisdiction over this
appeal through the Cohen collateral order doctrine.6" Although a final
decision had not been issued, the court agreed that the required elements
for an immediate appeal had been satisfied. ' The first two elements were
readily apparent: "[tihe transfer order conclusively determine[d] whether
the defendant [was] to be tried as an adult or a juvenile and resolve[d] an
important issue separate from whether the juvenile [was] innocent or
54. 132 F.3d 583 (10th Cir. 1997).
55. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 584-85.




60. See id. at 585-86.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
62. See id. at 586.
63. See id. at 587.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 589 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)); see
also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
66. See id. at 588 (quoting United States v. Angelo D., 88 F.3d 856, 858 (10th Cir. 1996)).
1999]
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guilty of the current charges." 7 The third requirement, "[w]hether the
transfer order would be effectively unreviewable from a final judgment,"
warranted a deeper analysise and required the court to consider the pur-
pose behind the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act." As previously dis-
cussed, the Act intends to grant further protection to children by remov-
ing them from ordinary criminal proceedings and attempting to rehabili-
tate them, thereby enhancing their chances of becoming functional adults
in society."'
Leon argued that no right was irretrievably lost if the appellate court
required the government to wait until the district court rendered a final
decision. Leon distinguished his case from a prior Tenth Circuit case,
Angelo D., asserting that when the government rather than the defendant
requests an appeal on a denial of transfer, the third Cohen element is not
satisfied.' The reason for this is that the government loses no right if the
court requires a final judgment before appeal.73
Leon was a case of first impression for the Tenth Circuit and the
court followed the approach adopted in both the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits in allowing the government to request such an appeal.' These cir-
cuits weighed the interests of the state in promoting rehabilitation and
protecting juveniles against the opposing interest of protecting citizehs
by keeping dangerous juveniles off the streets, especially if they met the
adult status requirements under the Federal Delinquency Act. Further-
more, because of the "double jeopardy" clause articulated in United
States v. Hawley,' the government would be unable to retry the juvenile
for the same offense." The government is permitted only one opportunity
to prosecute and should be afforded the same benefit as the defendant by




69. See id; see also Federal Juvenile Deliquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. II
1996).
70. See id. (citing Angelo D., 88 F.3d at 858; United States v. Brian N., 900 F,2d 218, 220
(10th Cir. 1990)).
71. 88 F.3d 856 (1Oth Cir. 1996).
72. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 588.
73. See id.
74. See id. (citing United States v. Doe, 94 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1995)).
75. See id. at 588-89.
76. 93 F.3d 682 (10th Cir. 1996).
77. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 589 (citing United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 687 (10th
Cir. 1996)). The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy protects against a second
prosecution or multiple punishments for the same offense. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; see also
Hawley, 93 F.3d at 687.




b. Motion to Transfer
In analyzing the district court's determination on the motion to
transfer, the Tenth Circuit balanced the six factors listed in section 5032
of the Federal Delinquency Act.' The court concluded that despite strong
arguments by the government in favor of transferring Leon to adult
status, the district court had broad discretion in weighing these factors."'
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that more pertinent
factors, other than Leon's proximity to the age of majority and the sever-
ity of the crime, outweighed the transfer to adult status.
82
The court reiterated that under section 5032, juvenile adjudication is
presumed suitable and the government has the burden to convince other-
wise. 3 Moreover, appellate review of section 5032 cases is highly defer-
ential, and the appellate court will only review when there is an abuse of
discretion.' A district court's ruling should only be overturned if the
court's factual findings were clearly erroneous, and not if another court
could merely weigh the factors differently and arrive at a different con-
clusion."
Despite Leon's proximity to the age of majority and the seriousness
of his crime, the court concluded that his slower intellectual development
and psychological immaturity, as well as the existence of several treat-
ment programs available to offenders of his type, required the Leon to be
tried as a juvenile.'
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Leon supports the argument that
courts aspire to protect the integrity of children. Since the appellate court
gave deference to the district court in weighing the statutory factors, an
analysis of the district court's findings is proper. On the merits, the dis-
trict court conducted a weighing of the various factors to determine the
appropriateness of either a juvenile or adult course of judicial action."
The court found that the two most influential factors favoring a transfer
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. [I 1996) (establishing statutory factors such as age
and social background of the child, the nature of the alleged offense, the extent and nature of the
juvenile's prior offense record, the child's present intellectual development and psychological ma-
turity, the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to them, and the availability of
programs developed to treat the child's behavioral problems).
81. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 590.
82. See id. at 590-91.
83. See id. at 589; see also United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583, 588 (2nd Cir. 1995); see also
United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 71 (5th Cir. 1995).
84. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 590; see also Juvenile Male No. 1,47 F.3d at 71.
85. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 590; see also Juvenile Male No. 1,47 F.3d at 71.
86. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 590.
87. See id. at 589-90.
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were that D.M. was almost of majority age, eighteen, at the time of the
offense and the crime's violent nature."
a. Factors Warranting a Transfer to Adult Status
The court pointed out the fact that Leon was three days away from
his eighteenth birthday, indicating just how close he was to being tried as
an adult without any further consideration of his disposition."' But Leon's
age was not the only factor examined.' The court also analyzed Leon's
social background, which included dropping out of high school and be-
ginning a relationship with a much older woman? Leon placed himself
in a father figure role by both fathering a child at the age of sixteen and
also by taking care of his mate's children from a previous relationship.'
Leon assumed these roles without any indication that he was capable of
doing so."
The court also weighed the seriousness of the crime as a factor fa-
voring adult adjudication." Leon was accused of murder, the most grave
of all criminal offenses." He sought to mitigate the impact of the charge
by arguing that he was under an incredible amount of pressure and was
burdened by the responsibility of caring for four children." Of course, the
fact that the Leon was himself a minor placed him at an even higher
risk.' Leon argued that these factors led to a loss of temper which, while
not excusable, should be considered.98
b. Factors Warranting Retention of Juvenile Status
The factors warranting juvenile adjudication were more persuasive
to the court. The first was Leon's immature nature-the court agreed that
his relationship with Ms. Chavez put him in an adult situation that he was
not mentally prepared to handle.? Moreover, school records indicated
that he was a slow learner and a below-average student." Leon was oc-
casionally employed, and his unsettled lifestyle weighed heavily in the
court's decision.'0'
88. See id. at 586.
89. See United States v. Leon, D.M., 953 F. Supp. 346, 348 (D.N.M. 1996), aff'd, 132 F.3d
583 (10th Cir. 1997).














Leon's delinquency record was substantial quantitatively, but not
qualitatively, and did not support a transfer particularly since he previ-
ously demonstrated no violent behavior." His record showed three minor
infractions: malicious mischief, a minor drug violation, and disorderly
conduct, for each of which he was fined only $100."'0 He failed to pay the
fines and also testified to smoking marijuana on occasion, but the court
viewed this as insignificant as compared to the behavior of juveniles in
other jurisdictions.'"
Additionally, Leon never had the benefit of prior treatment, a factor
which encouraged the court to retain him as a juvenile." The court ac-
knowledged the availability of many programs that had the potential to
successfully educate and rehabilitate Leon in a manner useful to
society.'"
c. Standard of Review
The government carries the burden of persuading the court of the
necessity of a transfer to adult status,' 7 and the court found in this situa-
tion that the statutory factors weighed heavily in favor of retaining Leon
as a juvenile." The court is not required to give equal weight to each
factor, but it can balance the factors in a manner that appears appropriate
under the specific circumstances."'" The trial court is afforded broad dis-
cretion in applying the balancing test, and no court of appeals has ever
reversed a trial court's decision on this matter."' Even if a higher court
could have reached a different conclusion, this would not suffice to re-
verse the lower court's decision, so long as the court made the requisite
factual findings."' Furthermore, the court is not required to state specifi-
cally whether each factor alone warrants a transfer."' Therefore, the dis-
trict court's findings set a foundation upon which the appellate court
could expand.
d. Impact of Decision
In deciding Leon, the Tenth Circuit followed the traditional path of
protecting the innocence of our children. The Tenth Circuit must be pre-
102. See United States v. Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d 583,586-87 (10th Cir. 1997).
103. See Leon, D.M., 953 F. Supp. at 348.
104. See id.
105. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 586-87.
106. See Leon, D.M., 953 F. Supp. at 349.
107. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 589.
108. See id. at 590.
109. Cf. United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1995). A seventeen-year-
old male was convicted on a charge of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. See i at 69.
110. See Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d at 71; see also United States v. One Juvenile Male, 40
F.3d 841 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bilbo, 19 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Parker, 956 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1992).
ill. Cf. Juvenile Male No. 1,47F.3dat71.
112. See United States v. Three Male Juveniles, 49 F.3d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir. 1995).
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pared for the steady increase in the number of violent juvenile crimes
that will be reflected in the juvenile justice system. Other circuits have
been forced to address juvenile crimes that shock the conscience-
schoolyard shootings, for example. These types of crimes will eventually
exert a formidable influence on the Tenth Circuit's direction in juvenile
law, and will force the courts to question the practicality of the current
trend protecting children. Society may shift away from rehabilitation, as
emphasized in the juvenile delinquency statutes, and toward harsher pun-
ishments that serve as a deterrent to the commission of further crimes
and satisfy society's appetite for retribution."3 Proponents of the punish-
ment theory may be anticipating the rising tide of public outrage against
violent juvenile crime, and the Tenth Circuit may adopt the punishment
theory perspective if they continue to address violent crime cases.
C. Other Circuits
Several circuits use the balancing test when deciding to transfer ju-
veniles to adult status."' The Fifth Circuit has rejected the argument that
each statutory factor needs to be argued and has said that the factors as a
whole must be balanced." In United States v. Three Juvenile Males, the
court held that some factors might indicate a stronger preference for
transfer, while others may mandate a retention of juvenile status."" Un-
like the Tenth Circuit's decision in Leon, the seriousness of defendants'
crimes and unsuccessful past rehabilitative treatments warranted a trans-
fer to adult status."7 This illustrates the discretion of trial courts in
weighing each statutory provision.
The Second Circuit also followed an "in the interest of justice"
scheme for transferring juveniles to adult criminal status."8 In United
States v. Juvenile Male No.1]," the court justified the transfer primarily
on the severity of the crime, which was drug distribution.' 2 "In the inter-
ests of justice, one last effort to stave off the downward course of life
[the defendant] has followed is the more appropriate choice."'2 ' The Sec-
ond Circuit also noted that the trial court's choice to focus more on a
defendant's background and lack of past treatment efforts, rather than the
seriousness of the crime and the defendant's past record, does not suffice
113. See Beatty, supra note 10, at 992-93. Retribution stands for the proposition of revenge,
while deterrence discourages offenders from repeating criminal acts. See id.
114. See United States v. Three Male Juveniles, 49 F.3d 1058, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1995).
115. See Three Male Juveniles, 49 F.3d at 1061.
116. See id. at 1060-61 (citing United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1989)).
In this case, a thirteen-year-old juvenile was convicted of armed robbery. See id. at 1249.
117. See Three Male Juveniles, 49 F.3d at 1062.
118. See United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1995).
119. 47 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1995).
120. See Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d at 69-70.
121. Id. at 70.
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for a finding of abuse of discretion.'" Here, another circuit diverged from
Leon in concluding that the seriousness of the crime was enough to jus-
tify adult adjudication.
Another Second Circuit opinion, United States v. Nelson,'" focused
on whether age should be considered at the time of the offense or at the
time of the possible transfer.' Since the judicial process is so time con-
suming, a defendant may not be best suited for juvenile-type rehabilita-
tion by the time of adjudication." This appellate court disagreed with the
trial court's decision to exclude the defendant's current age from its
analysis and remanded the case for further findings." This notion was
not addressed in the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the Leon case.
The Seventh Circuit also emphasized the importance of discretion in
the trial court:
[W]e join those circuits today and hold that the district court had dis-
cretion to give more weight to some factors than to others. Determin-
ing whether the transfer of a juvenile to adult status is in the interest of
justice is not a simple arithmetical exercise, where the court adds up
all the factors to see if the sum is a positive or negative number."' 7
As a result, most circuits use the balancing test, but each circuit gives
weight to different statutory factors.
II. JUVENILES As WITNESSES
A. Background
Another prevalent issue in the juvenile justice system focuses on
when children may be called as witnesses. The history of juveniles as
witnesses illustrates the special protection that courts offer only to chil-
dren."" Deeply rooted in our justice system is the desire to maintain a
person's innocence until proven guilty." The United States Constitution
provides that a defendant is entitled to confront any witnesses
presented;' 3 however, the inclination to protect children offsets this
122. See id. at 71.
123. 68 F.3d 583 (2d Cir. 1995).
124. See Nelson, 68 F.3d at 589.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 589, 591 (stating that "[b]y completely eliminating current age from its assess-
ment, the district court misinterpreted the full significance of the age factor").
127. United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610,614 (7th Cir. 1998).
128. Cf. Hon. Barbara Gilleran-Johnson & Timothy R. Evans, The Criminal Courtroom: Is It
Child Proof?, 26 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 681,682 (1995).
129. Cf. Kermit V. Lipez, The Child Witness in Sexual Abuse Cases in Maine: Presentation,
Impeachment, and Controversy, 42 ME. L. REv. 283, 286-87 (1990).
130. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
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ideal.' Courts envision children as very delicate and hesitate to put them
through the trauma of testifying live in court.
Moreover, courts may be reluctant to place children on the stand
since they fear that their testimony is likely to be both inconsistent and
inaccurate. These concerns make it difficult for any court to find a reli-
able formula to use when exercising its dual role as protector of the in-
terests of juvenile witnesses and the constitutional ideal.
The Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights"' (CVCWR) statute
governs juvenile witnesses. Congress enacted the statute as an answer to
the public policy concerns of protecting and nurturing our children."' The
CVCWR allows two alternatives to live testimony: taped deposition or
live, two-way, closed-circuit television." Furthermore, the statute ex-




The first question to address is the competency of the juvenile to tes-
tify. Second, if a court finds a child to be competent, it must assess his or
her credibility, and determine if allowing the child to testify is in the
child's best interest.'" Particularly in sexual abuse cases, the child may
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also LUCY S. McGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES 159-61 (1994) (discussing
judicial interpretation of the Confrontation Clause and, in particular, the definition of "confronta-
tion").
131. See Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 682.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1994 & Supp. H 1996). This statute defines words under "Child vic-
tims' and child witnesses' rights." Id. A "child" is defined as "a person who is under the age of 18,
who is or is alleged to be--(A) a victim of a crime of physical abuse, sexual abuse, or exploitation;
or '(B) a witness to a crime committed against another person." Id. The statute also sets out alterna-
tives to live in-court testimony, including competency examinations, privacy protection, closing the
courtroom, victim impact statements, use of multidisciplinary child abuse teams, guardians ad litem,
adult attendants, speedy trials, stay of civil actions, and testimonial aids. See id.
133. Cf. Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 692.
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1), (2). The statute allows for these alternatives "in a proceeding
involving an alleged offense against a child." Id § 3509(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A).
135. See id. § 3509(c)(1), (2).
136. See id. § 3509(b)(2)(B)(i). This section states that a child may be unable to testify live in
court for any of the following reasons:
(1) The child will be unable to testify because of fear.
(U) There is a substantial likelihood, established by expert testimony, that the child
would suffer emotional trauma from testifying in open court.
(I1) The child suffers a mental or other infirmity.
(IV) Conduct by the defendant or defense counsel causes the child to be unable to con-
tinue testifying.
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be too afraid to face his or her alleged assailant,'37 and the child's fear
may affect the quality of his or her testimony.' 3
a. Competency
A court must find children as well as adults "competent" before
granting them the opportunity to testify.'3 The Federal Rules of Evidence
provide that "[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as oth-
erwise provided in these rules,"'" which the CVCWR expanded upon.
While most children are found competent to testify, it is the absence of
credibility that ultimately bars their testimony."' Courts have the oppor-
tunity to manipulate the system. A judge may prohibit a child's testi-
mony by discrediting him or her on account of lack of personal knowl-
edge'2 or due to unfair prejudice."" Higher courts also prefer to honor
lower courts' discretion on the issue of competency and will rarely
overturn a trial court's holding."
Witness competency is usually the overriding issue in child sex
abuse cases because the child victim is often the only eyewitness to the
alleged event besides the purported abuser.'' Courts are concerned that
children, either because of emotional trauma, lack of sophistication, or
fear of consequences, may not be the most reliable witnesses." Yet,
sometimes these children are the only direct link between the child and
the offender.' 7 Although federal rules" are in place regarding these fac-
137. See Brannon, supra note 9, at 459.
138. See id.
139. Cf Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 685.
140. FED. R. EVID. 601.
141. Cf Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 686; Robin W. Morey, The Competency
Requirement for the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse: Must We Abandon It?, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 245,
272 (1985).
142. See FED. R. EVID. 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is intro-
duced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.").
143. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (stating that any piece of evidence may be inadmissible if the risk
of unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value). Here, if the children relay a frightening story, or
one that is incredibly offensive, a jury might convict out of sympathy for the child instead of a belief
that the evidence proved the defendant's guilt.
144. See id. ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."); see also United States v. Gomez, 807 F.2d
1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Bickford v. John E. Mitchell Co. 595 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Spoonhunter, 476 F.2d 1050 (10th Cir. 1973)).
145. Cf. MCGoUGH, supra note 130, at 2; Morey, supra note 141, at 245.
146. See Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 685, 687 (stating that before the court
may allow a child to testify as a witness, it must determine that the child is capable of "observing the
events of the particular matter in question," recalling the events, and truthfully relating those events
to the court).
147. See id. See generally MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WITNESS at ix (Maria S.
Zaragoza et a]. eds., 1995) (observing that "[miounting pressures to prosecute cases of child sexual
and physical abuse have increased the courtroom appearances of child witnesses and raised ques-
tions about the accuracy and reliability of their reports").
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1994 & Supp. U 1996).
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tors, different jurisdictions implement them in different ways. 9 Judges
ask children different questions in order to ascertain their competency as
witnesses." This lack of a single standard fosters inconsistency through-
out the judicial system.
b. Credibility
A widely held theory regarding child testimony is that children have
a tendency to get confused and do not comprehend concepts of truth and
falsehood, right and wrong, and memory." Some argue that children do
not have many experiences from which to draw and compare, they have
a smaller vocabulary," and they are not sophisticated enough to make
certain rational connections. Adults also assume that even if children are
capable of understanding what it means to tell the truth, they do not un-
derstand the ramifications if they fail to do so, especially in the court-
room." Although many adults believe that children succumb to coaching
and suggestions,"' they forget to acknowledge the susceptibility of adults
to these practices as well."'
But evidence of weak child testimony is not indisputable. Another
theory claims that while a child witness's recollection of events may be
less complete than an adult's, it is qualitatively richer." Many psycho-
logical experts express their desire to describe techniques to those who
interview children that will "maximize the informativeness of children's
testimony while minimizing the risks of impeaching their credibility." 
7
c. Constitutional Issdes
Another concern governing child witnesses involves speculation of
emotional trauma on the child after testifying. According to the United
States Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to confront his or
her witnesses."" But, this right "must be balanced against the potential
149. Cf. Morey, supra note 141, at 257.
150. See id. at 268.
151. See Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 686-87 (noting that children most often
become confused when testifying as the victim, that this confusion is really a mask for the emotional
trauma they feel, and that testifying can be devastating to the child).
152. See Michael E. Lamb et al., Making Children into Competent Witnesses: Reactions to the
Amicus Brief in In re Michaels, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 438,440 (1995).
153. See Belle Kinnan Deaver, The Competency of Children, 4 Cooley L. Rev. 522,523 (1987).
154. See id.; see also JON'A F. MEYER, INACCURACIES IN CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY: MEMORY,
SuGGESTILITY, OR OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY? 34-35 (1997).
155. See Deaver, supra note 153, at 526, 531; see also MEYER, supra note 154, at 31, 48;
Lamb, supra note 152, at 445 (asserting that "[aldults, like children, respond to coercion, peer pres-
sure, and manipulation, and children are not well served by the implicit assumption that they hold
within their minds more information than they are able to provide").
156. See MEYER, supra note 154, at 15; see also Lamb, supra note 152, at 439.
157. Lamb, supra note 152, at 439.
158. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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psychological injury the victim may suffer from such encounters."'" The
state's interest is not always met since preventing a juvenile from testi-
fying who may have "the most accurate information ' can lower the
probability of conviction resulting in less punishment to offenders.
2. Case Law and the Child Witness in the Tenth Circuit
The first case to address the issue of child competency arose in 1895.
In Wheeler v. United States,'6' the Supreme Court introduced the theory
that "there is no precise age which determines the question of compe-
tency."" The Court began to consider the different rates at which people
mature"3 and held that competency depended on "the capacity and intel-
ligence of the child, his appreciation of the difference between truth and
falsehood, as well as of his duty to tell the former.'"" In 1973, the Tenth
Circuit used the Wheeler test to decide if a five-year-old child was intel-
ligent, could tell the difference between truth and falsehood, could un-
derstand the repercussions of lying at trial, and knew what it meant to
take an oath."3 The Wheeler test remains active with some variation de-
pending on the circuit." In 1975, Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence'67 was enacted which, along with the 1990 statute addressing child
witnesses,'" attempted to streamline competency requirements. Through
the promulgation of these rules, the Tenth Circuit now presumes children
competent witnesses and "the party seeking to prevent a child from testi-
fying has the burden of providing a compelling reason for questioning
the child's competence.'"
159. Julie Oseid, Defendants' Rights in Child Witness Competency Hearings: Establishing
Constitutional Procedures for Sexual Abuse Cases, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1377, 1380 (1985); see also
infra note 224 and accompanying text.
160. Oseid, supra note 159, at 1380.
161. Wheeler v, United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524 (1895). This was a murder trial in which the
son of the deceased was going to testify. See id
162. Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 524.
163. See id.
164. Id. The trial court judge essentially was given sole discretion to determine the capacity of
the child. See id. at 524-25 (stating that the decision of the trial judge will only be overturned upon a
showing that the decision was clearly erroneous).
165. See United States v. Spoonhunter, 476 F.2d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 1973) (citing Wheeler,
159 U.S. at 523). The court does not explain whether "intelligence" means average intelligence for a
five year old or more intelligent than the average five-year-old.
166. A number of courts have followed the Wheeler test. Cf., e.g., Turner v. American Sec. &
Trust Co. 213 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1909) (citing Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 524); United States v. Schoe-
field, 465 F.2d 560, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citing Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 523); Pocatello v. United
States, 394 F.2d 115, 116-17 (9th Cir. 1968) (citing Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 523); State v. Oliver, 49
N.W.2d 564, 573 (N.D.-1951) (citing Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 523).
167. FED. R. EVID. 601 (deeming "every person" competent).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
169. United States v. Allen J., 127 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 1997).
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B. Tenth Circuit Case-United States v. Allen J.70
1. Facts
Allen J. was fifteen years old when a federal court convicted him of
violating the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 7' for knowingly using
force to engage in a sexual act with a thirteen-year-old juvenile."" The
court obtained jurisdiction because both Allen J. and the victim were
Native American and the crime took place within the Navajo Nation In-
dian Reservation.'" Although the case involved rape and sexual abuse,
the sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in finding that
the thirteen-year-old victim was competent to testify."
Allen J. filed a motion challenging the victim's capability to testify
and requested an official competency examination by the court."' In sup-
port of the motion, Allen J. introduced evidence that the victim suffered
from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome," and argued that the Syndrome rendered
the victim mildly retarded and learning disabled.'" Allen J. also con-
tended that due to the victim's poor verbal skills, she would be unable to
correctly relate the events of the evening in question. Allen J. argued
that this showed the victim was incompetent to testify.'
79
The trial court rejected Allen J.'s argument on the grounds that de-
spite the victim's slower learning capabilities, she was generally older
than most, and at least as capable as many children who previously testi-
fied."l The victim answered preliminary questions about her name and
age, and questions regarding truth and falsehood in general.' Although
the victim answered most of these questions accurately, Allen J. rested
the incompetency claim on the silences and inconsistencies that riddled
the victim's testimony concerning the rape."'
170. 127 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1204 (1998).
171. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1994 & Supp. H 1996).
172. See Allen J., 127 F.3d at 1293.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 1294.
176. See id. The two pieces of evidence introduced consisted of (1) a "6-9 Year EPSDT
Tracking form" which was completed four years prior to the trial (December 30, 1992) and (2) a
report from a pediatrician dated October 9, 1993. Id. This document stated that the child suffered
from "developmental delay and mild mental retardation," but that it was inconclusive as to whether
this was a result of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome. Id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. The defendant stated that a competency examination was needed due to the vic-








The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's de-
termination that the victim was competent to testify. 3 The court rea-
soned that any inconsistencies in the victim's story or problems with her'
testimony raised questions of credibility, not competency," Rule 601 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence presumes competency of a witness,'" and
the trial court had broad discretion in declaring the victim competent to
testify.'86
In addition to the discretion granted to the trial judge, the court rec-
ognized the statutory presumption that children are competent
witnesses.'87 The statutory scheme places the burden of proof on the party
seeking to discredit the child's competency. 8 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3509, Allen J. needed to produce evidence that would show a "compel-
ling reason" to mandate a competency examination.'" The court rejected
Allen J.'s evidence as unpersuasive, and allowed the victim to testify,
leaving her inconsistent answers for the trier of fact to assess.'"'
183. See id. The questioning proceeded as follows:
When the victim was called to testify, the court asked her a series of questions seeking to
confirm she understood the importance of the oath. These questions included: "Do you
understand what it is to tell the truth?" and "Do you know the difference between the
truth and a lie?" The victim did not respond to the judge's questioning. (The court then
asked the prosecutor to try questioning the witness. The prosecutor began with simple
questions ("[Wihat is your last name?", "How old are you?", and "Where do you live?"),
which the victim answered. After about thirty questions along these lines, almost all of
which the victim was able to answer correctly, the prosecutor shifted the questions relat-
ing to the difference between the truth and lies. Among other questions, the prosecutor
asked the victim if she understood she had promised to tell the truth in court, to which the
victim responded affirmatively. After this series of questions, which established the vic-
tim knew the difference between a truth and a lie, knew she was to tell the truth in court,
and knew she would be punished if she told a lie, the court directed the prosecutor to pro-
ceed to the heart of her case.).
Id. at 1295 (alteration in original).
184. See id. at 1296.
185. FED. R. EvID. 601.
186. See Allen J., 127 F.3d at 1295, 1296 (citing Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524-
25 (1895) (stating that the standard of review is abuse of discretion)).
187. See id. at 1294; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c)(2) (1994).
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c)(1)--(4). This section states:
(1) ... Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to abrogate rule 601 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. (2)... A child is presumed to be competent. (3) ... A competency
examination regarding a child witness may be conducted by the court only upon written
motion and offer of proof of incompetency by a party. (4) ... A competency examination
regarding a child may be conducted only if the court determines, on the record, that com-
pelling reasons exist. A child's age alone is not a compelling reason.
Id.
189. Allen J., 127 F.3d at 1295.
190. See id. at 1296. The court continued by pointing out:
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court held it was proper for a five-year-old to
give critical testimony in a capital case .... Since that time, the trend in the law has been
to grant trial courts even greater leeway in deciding if a witness is competent to testify.
Id. (citing Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524 (1895); United States v. Cook, 949 F.2d 289,
293 (10th Cir. 1991)); cf, e.g., supra note 186.
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3. Analysis
a. Competency
The Tenth Circuit expanded upon basic principles of evidence law
in rendering its decision. Courts approach the competency of witnesses,
whether children or adults, in a similar manner.'9 ' Competency is such an
essential issue because the presence or absence of a witness's testimony
may decisively affect the outcome of a case. By passing the threshold
requirement of competency, the doors open as to the amount of informa-
tion attainable through a witness, thereby bolstering his or her believ-
ability.
The court in Allen J. rejected the Wheeler test for competency of
children, a test that "depends on the capacity and intelligence of the
child, [the child's] appreciation of the difference between truth and
falsehood, as well as of [the child's] duty to tell the former."' Wheeler
was decided before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
which state that "[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules."'93 The court interpreted this narrowly
and rejected Allen J.'s claims that a child victim's hesitation and inaccu-
rate answers should cause the court to deem that child incompetent. '
Attorneys must realize the importance of deeming a child a competent
witness. Although it appears that recent statutory provisions make it easy
to deem a child competent,'" judges still retain broad discretion to reject
claims of competency.'" The judge can discredit a child witness due to a
finding of lack of personal knowledge"' or unfair prejudice,'" but he or she
may also find other compelling evidence rendering that child
191. See Allen J., 127 F.3d at 1294 (stating that Federal Rule of Evidence 601 and 18 U.S.C. §
3509 serve as guidelines to determine when children are competent to be witnesses).
192. Id. at 1294-95 (quoting Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 524).
193. FED. R. EviD. 601. The federal rules on witnesses do not specifically mention children.
See id.
194. Allen J., 127 F.3d at 1296 (stating that "[a]ny inconsistencies in the victim's story or
problems with her testimony, however, raise questions of credibility, not competence," and, "[t]his
court has rejected similar arguments before").
195. See FED. R. EviD. 601 (deeming every person competent to be a witness).
196. See FD. R. EvID. 403 (stating that, "[ajlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence").
197. See FED. R. EvID. 602.
198. See FED. R. EviD. 403.
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incompetent.'" Advocates for child witnesses must be prepared to show
that the child witnesses meet the threshold standard for competency.'
Furthermore, comparison between a juvenile's and an adult's abili-
ties to recall information, to relay that information accurately, and to be
susceptible to suggestion and leading questions are factors in determin-
ing competency." The court will focus on specific attributes unique to
children,' such as the child's capacity to tell the truth.' The child must
be aware of the difference between truth and falsehood, and comprehend
the taking of an oath. 4 Next, the court tests the child's mental capacity.'
To help assure accurate recall of the event, the court will require that the
child have sufficient mental capacity and memory at the time of the
event.' Finally, the child must be able to effectively translate his or her
experiences to others and be able to understand and answer simple ques-
tions.' Each of these elements will play a role in determining the com-
petency of juveniles to testify,' making it harder for juveniles than for
adults to freely testify and tell their stories.
The myth that adults tell the truth and children lie' is not only ap-
parent in our judicial system, but also in our everyday lives. "[T]he rela-
tionship between age and memory is complex, with a variety of factors
influencing the quality of information provided." ' Since this research is
inconclusive, it is often difficult to create ways to improve the quality of
children's testimony. 211
199. See Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 685 (stating that the court will also
examine the child's intelligence, ability to receive correct impressions, and the child's age when
determining whether a child is competent to testify).
200. See id. at 685 (explaining that to show competency, the advocate of the child witness must
show that the witness has "a minimum capacity to observe, recollect, and recount the incident to
which the witness will testify").
201. See Baker, supra note 9, at 1044-45.







209. See Deaver, supra note 153, at 522.
210. Lamb et al., supra note 152, at 440. Some factors mentioned are the difference between
script memories (representations of typical events, not a particular one as remembered) and episodic
memories, recall memory ("tell me everything you remember... ") and recognition memory ("Was
his shirt red'?"), and memory performance and memory capacity (children are less capable of retain-
ing large amounts of information, particularly due to their age). Id. at 439-40.
211. See MEYER, supra note 154, at 115. Despite the varying opinions of others, Meyer sug-
gests ways to improve children's testimonies, including: learn from others' mistakes, avoid leading
questions, use indirect and nonverbal techniques, rehearsals, reduce perceived authority of inter-
viewer, teach children about their role in the courts, train children to answer questions, and teach
children to watch for misleading items. See L at 116-23. 1
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b. Effects on Juveniles Who Testify
Finding a juvenile competent to testify represents only the first hur-
dle in considering the issue of children as witnesses.2 As previously
mentioned, a child-victim may suffer profound detrimental effects by
confronting his or her alleged perpetrator.2 3 A child's advocate must con-
sider whether the benefits of allowing the child an opportunity to be
heard outweigh the potential trauma of giving testimony.2"' Factors to
consider include, but are not limited to, the age of the child, the circum-
stances surrounding the trial (e.g., the type of offense), the ability of the
child to speak effectively in front of groups, and the level of maturity." '
The state has a particularly strong interest in protecting victims of
sexual assault."6 Accordingly, the government enacted federal statutes to
enlarge the opportunity of juveniles to testify while at the same time di-
minishing their trauma."7 As an alternative to live testimony, attorneys
may request the testimony to be taken outside of the courtroom and be
televised by a two-way closed-circuit television."' The number of periph-
eral people permitted in the room is limited,"9 and this may serve as a
more efficient and less shocking way to gather information.'
Another alternative to live, in-court testimony is to obtain a video-
taped deposition from the child."I This method provides the child with a
completely private interview session, possibly serving as an incentive to
testify.
The most controversial aspect of juvenile witnesses is balancing the
rights of the accused against those of the victim.' "The state's interest in
protecting child witnesses from the distress of testifying conflicts with
the accused's right to confront all witnesses against him."' There is no
concrete answer to'this inquiry, and one must be sensitive to the different
212. See generally Berliner, supra note 8, at 169 (discussing two issues surrounding the use of
juveniles as witnesses: emotional trauma afforded to the child by testifying and whether or a not a
child is competent to testify).
213. See Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 687.
214. See id. at 682 (explaining that before a minor testifies, judges and attorneys must weigh
the interests of justice against the best interests of the child).
215. See id. at 685-87.
216. See Brannon, supra note 9, at 459.
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (providing alternatives to live testimony).
218. See id. § 3509(b)(1).
219. See id. § 3509(b)(1)(D).
220. Cf Brannon, supra note 9, at 459.
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(2).
222. See Brannon, supra note 9, at 459 (arguing that alternative procedures by which a child
can testify. may lessen the trauma to the child).
223. See Baker, supra note 9, at 1055.
224. Brannon, supra note 9, at 459.
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arguments on each side. Each situation should be determined on a case-
by-case basis, utilizing a test which weighs the interests of the parties.'m
Considering the dramatic increase in sex abuse cases over the last
few years, there likely will be a dramatic increase in the number of child
witnesses.' Communities and children's advocates have begun to de-
velop ways to make the testimonial process easier for juveniles.'m In or-
der to reduce emotional trauma, entities involved in protecting child
abuse cases agree to follow certain procedures and "create[] an atmos-
phere of cooperation and coordination in order to facilitate child partici-
pation."' Some approaches include using of specially trained personnel
who understand the importance of their work, decreasing the number of
interviews with juveniles and the number of people who interview them,
and assigning the same individual to work with them throughout each
case to promote consistency." In addition, advocates encourage the use
of certain devices, such as special interviewing rooms and anatomically
correct dolls.' ° Specialists in juvenile law believe that if legal entities
follow these operations, children's performance as witnesses will im-
prove, thereby increasing their credibility."
C. Other Circuits
Treatment of child witnesses is not uniform throughout the judicial
system.2 Statutes and rules of evidence serve as guidelines for both fed-
erally enacted and state enacted law"3 under which the competency of
juvenile witnesses is construed liberally.' Before these rules were en-
225. See id. at 449 (stating the test denoting when an exception should exist to the confrontation
clause: "First, the exception must further an important public policy. Second, an individualized
determination that the particular child witness would be traumatized by testifying in the presence of
the accused must be made.").
226. See Berliner, supra note 8, at 169.





232. See Morey, supra note 141, at 257. Morey offers the following example:
In one jurisdiction, the courts treat the child's ability to receive accurate impressions of
fact as merely indicating the credibility of the witness. In another jurisdiction, the same
ability determines the child's competency to be a witness. Thus, the inconsistency is
more significant than having the same child found competent by one judge and incom-
petent by another.
Id.
233. Cf id. at 251 (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence and the 1974 Uniform Rules of
Evidence reflect the modem view of competency in children witnesses).
234. See id. at 247-48.
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acted, some courts grappled with the issue of child testimony,""5 and dif-
ferent state laws reflect the different policies among jurisdictions.'
For example, a 1953 D.C. Circuit case, Doran v. United States,37
emphasized that competency determinations should rest within the dis-
cretionary authority of the trial court." The court reasoned that the judge
is in a much better position than any appellate tribunal to consider
and to weigh all of the impalpable factors which should be taken into
account, such as the attitude and demeanor of the witness, the extent
of her intelligence and the degree of moral responsibility of which she
might be capable.239
Furthermore, this early decision mentioned that specific answers to
questions are not the deciding factors; rather, the child's responses in-
form the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony. 240
Recently promulgated rules reflect the century-long trend toward al-
lowing children to testify." In particular, the Ninth Circuit, using rea-
soning similar to the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Allen J., allowed the
inconsistent testimony of a four-year-old child.' 2 "A finder of fact might
well look with scepticism on [the child's] testimony, but that is a ques-
tion of weight, not admissibility." ' Another issue in earlier Ninth Circuit
cases was the controversy about testifying via two-way closed-circuit
television.2 " As designated in the United States Code, this is an accept-
able way for children to testify if the child exhibits a fear of confronting
the alleged perpetrator. ' A 1993 Ninth Circuit decision, United States v.
Garcia,' used a Supreme Court decision, Maryland v. Craig," to ana-
lyze whether the use of a video violated the Confrontation Clause as
specified in the Constitution's Sixth Amendment.' The court held that
since Congress enacted section 3509 after the decision in Craig, it in-
235. See id. at 250 (recalling that, for example, two early commentators argued that even if
courts admitted child testimony, the testimony would be of "dubious value" because all children are
limited by immaturity and imagination).
236. See id. at 257.
237. 205 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
238. Doran, 205 F.2d at 718 (citing Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895)).
239. Id. at 718-19 (citing Williams v. United States, 3 App. D.C. 335 (1894)).
240. See id. at 719.
241. Cf Morey, supra note 141, at 247, 250-51.
242. See Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d 1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1389 (1998). This case also examines the testimony of a child who allegedly was sexually as-
saulted and raped by an older man. Walters, 122 F.3d at 1175
243. Id.
244. See United States v. Garcia, 7 F3d 885, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1993) (including an analysis of
the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation).
245. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (b)(l)(B) (1994).
246. 7 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1993).
247. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
248. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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tended for a child's concerns to outweigh a defendant's ability to con-
front the witness face-to-face, thereby codifying this rule?'9
The Eighth Circuit also ruled on the use of two-way, closed-circuit
televisions.2" This court held that the statute does not require a "because
of fear" finding to let the child testify through video." The court merely
needs to use its own discretion in deciding whether the child shows any
signs of needing to testify this way, either through judicial questioning or
analysis of the child's appearance. " By making such an inquiry, the
court again protects the rights of children. Although most jurisdictions
seek to protect children, it is apparent through different state laws that
jurisdictions implement this desire in differing degrees.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged the intricacies of the current
juvenile justice system through decisions involving both transfer pro-
ceedings and child witnesses during the survey period.
Although the balancing test set forth in the Federal Juvenile Delin-
quency Act is used in prosecuting transfer cases, the underlying issue is
not the consideration of each factor. The courts are concerned with the
broader ramifications of trying juveniles as adults. Some research indi-
cates that adult criminal courts treat juveniles more sympathetically than
in juvenile courts."3 Unfortunately, it is impossible to accurately predict
who will benefit from rehabilitative efforts and who is bound for a life of
crime. Courts must analyze each situation on a case-by-case basis; be-
cause society strives to promote individual growth and stimulation in its
children, inflexible standards governing transfer might serve as inade-
quate.
The trend to treat juveniles as adults is not only recognized in trans-
fer proceedings, but also when considering children as witnesses. 2'
Courts must analyze three conditions: competency, credibility, and the
psychological effect of live testimony.' Although it seems that child
249. See Garcia, 7 F.3d at 888.
250. See United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 1997).
251. See Rouse, 111 F.3d at 569.
252. See id.
253. See Klein, supra note 13, at 402. Klein states:
In addition to sentencing disparities between the juvenile and criminal systems, there are
four main areas where the concrete negative consequences of transfer can be seen as they
relate to the individual child. These are (1) the swiftness of sanctions imposed; (2) recidi-
vism rates for transferred juveniles versus those for non-transferred juveniles; (3) the loss
of rehabilitative opportunities for transferred juveniles; and (4) the effects of incarcerat-
ing children in adult prisons.
Id.
254. Cf Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 128, at 685 (stating that in all cases, after ana-
lyzing three separate criteria, a court must find all witnesses competent, whether they are adults or
children, before allowing either to testify).
255. See id. at 682, 685.
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witnesses often are given the opportunity to be heard, judges can still
exclude testimony when there is a lack of personal knowledge' or unfair
prejudice. 7 More commonly, courts also consider the child's maturity
level, memory, communication skills, and mental capacity.7s As illus-
trated, the trend of protecting children begins and ends with each indi-
vidual juvenile defendant. In order to keep some form of standardization,
however, Congress should develop a consistent framework by which the
courts can analyze each case.
The area of juvenile law is forever changing. Although historically
the justice system has protected children's innocence, the future is un-
certain. With increasing juvenile crime rates and new technological de-
velopments, the prospects for the promulgation of a uniform standard by
which to treat juveniles, particularly in the Tenth Circuit, seem bleak, but
attainable.
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256. See FED. R. EVID. 602. For text of the rule, see supra note 142.
257. See FED. R. EvID. 403. For text of the rule, see supra note 196.
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